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ANTITRUST LAW-THE REQUIREMENT OF AN INSTRUCTION ON INTENT
IN PER SE CRIMINAL VIOLATIONS OF SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN
ACT.
United States v. Gillen (1979)
Gillen, president and chief executive officer of Blue Coal Corporation
(Blue Coal), along with four other individuals and six major anthracite corpo-
rations,' was prosecuted under section 1 of the Sherman Act (Act) for con-
spiring to fix the price of anthracite coal. 2 From 1961 through 1973-
during the latter half of which period Gillen was president of Blue Coal-
executives of the major coal producers in northeastern Pennsylvania met
three to four times per year as the Anthracite Producer's Advisory Board
(APAB) to establish "production quotas" as authorized by the federally ap-
proved Production Control Plan for the Anthracite Industry. 3 Following
these conferences, the executives held "after meetings" to discuss and agree
on price lists for the sale of coal to dealers not located in the respective
companies' vicinity.4 Sales representative Carl Tomaine attended those
meetings on behalf of Blue Coal. 5
Tomaine, the government's chief witness in this nonjury case, testified
before the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsyl-
vania that he had reported to Gillen that the executives at the after meet-
ings, including himself, were "discussing prices" and that "they agreed to go
along on certain prices" to be printed in the price list.6 He also informed
Gillen that Blue Coal was going to charge the agreed-upon prices. 7
The district court found Gillen guilty of engaging in a conspiracy to fix
prices because he "knew of the existence of the conspiracy and . . . because
1. See United States v. Gillen, 458 F. Supp. 887, 889 (M.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd, 559 F.2d 541
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 866 (1979). The companies were engaged in the mining, proc-
essing, and marketing of anthracite coal in northeastern Pennsylvania. 458 F. Supp. at 889.
2. 458 F. Supp. at 889. For a discussion of the statutory provisions of the Sherman Act, see
note 13 infra.
3. 458 F. Supp. at 891.
4. Id. At the meetings subsequent to the APAB meetings, tentative agreements on prices,
to be printed in "price circulars," were reached by the sales representatives of the respective
companies. Id. Upon each representative's receiving his superior's approval of the agreed-upon
price, the price circulars were sent to non-local purchasers of coal. Id. at 892. At times, how-
ever, the companies did sell above the circular price. Id. at 891. When sales were made at a
price below that quoted in the circular, "the circular price was used as the level from which
discounts were determined." Id.
5. Id. at 892. Tomaine was vice-president of sales for Blue Coal from 1966 to mid-1973. Id.
As sales representative, Tomaine was the sole active participant for Blue Coal at the meetings of
the APAB. Id.
6. Id. at 895. Tomaine was named as an unindicted co-conspirator in the indictment and
later agreed to testify as a government witness. Id. at 892.
7. Id. The court noted that "some of the prices printed by one or more of them could, at
times, vary somewhat from the others if necessary to compensate for a peculiar market or




Susko: Antitrust Law - The Requirement of an Instruction on Intent in Pe
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1980
THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW
he knowingly participated in it.", On appeal, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit 9 affirmed, holding 1) that knowing participa-
tion in a conspiracy to fix prices is sufficient to sustain criminal liability, and
2) that the elevated level of intent to effectuate an anticompetitive effect
required by the Supreme Court in United States v. United States Gypsum
Co. 10 was not required for per se antitrust violations." United States v.
Gillen, 599 F.2d 541 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 866 (1979).
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits " [e]very contract, combination
... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade."12 Since the 1974 amendments,
violations of the Act constitute a felony for which "[e]very person who shall
make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby de-
clared to be illegal" is criminally liable.'
3
The parameters of the conduct prohibited by the broad and nonspecific
language of section 114 were developed in a long line of judicial opinions.15
8. Id. at 893-94. Gillen testified that he had never been involved with the marketing as-
pects of coal mining. Id. at 893. Gillen further testified that he had given authority to Tomaine
to price the company's coal, and that Tomaine had never told him that the other companies had
agreed to "fix" the price of coal. Id. The district court, however, believed Tomaine's testimony
and found that Gillen was a knowing participant in the conspiracy. Id. at 894. Having found that
a conspiracy existed, the district court convicted Gillen, finding that his help with, or authoriza-
tion of, the agreement was sufficient involvement. Id. For a discussion of the level of intent
required by the Third Circuit, see notes 55-59 and accompanying text infra.
9. The case was heard by Judges Higginbotham, Aldisert, and Adams. Judge Higginbotham
wrote the opinion of the court. Judge Adams separately concurred. 599 F.2d 541, 541 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 866 (1979).
10. 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
11. The district court opinion was issued on June 18, 1978. 458 F. Supp. at 887. Less than
two weeks later, on June 29, 1978, the United States Supreme Court handed down the Gypsum
decision. See 438 U.S. at 422. Thus, the district court decided Gilen without considering the
intent requirement enunciated in Gypsum. See 599 F.2d at 543. For a discussion of per se
violations of the Act, see notes 25-40 and accompanying text infra.
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). See also id. §§ 2-7.
13. Id. § 1. The penalties for § 1 offenses were upgraded to felony status by the Antitrust
Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-528, 88 Stat. 1708 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1 (1976)). Included in the upgraded status were increases in maximum fines which could be
imposed-up to $1 million for corporate defendants and $100,000 for individual defendants-
and in prison sentences-up to three years for individual defendants. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
Additionally, the government is empowered to bring injunctive actions to have certain agree-
ments, or parts thereto, prohibited. Id. § 4. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405
U.S. 596, 597 (1972) (injunction against exclusive territorial agreements); United States v. Con-
tainer Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333, 334 (1969) (injunction against intradefendant exchange of
price information); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 378 (1933) (unsuc-
cessful attempt to enjoin coal producers from marketing coal through common association).
Private citizens are also authorized to bring suit for treble damages under § 4 of the
Clayton Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). For a discussion of state antitrust policies and their
relationship to the Sherman Act, see Flynn, Criminal Sanctions Under State & Federal Anti-
trust Laws, 45 TEX. L. REV. 1301 (1967).
14. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1910). As noted by the Supreme
Court, "the contracts or acts embraced in the provision [i.e., § 1] were not expressly defined
since the enumeration addressed itself simply to classes of acts, those classes being broad
enough to embrace every conceivable contract or combination which could be made ..... Id.
at 60.
15. See id. The Standard Oil Court stated:
[I]t inevitably follows that [§ 1] necessarily called for the exercise of judgment which
1979-19801
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In an early decision, the Supreme Court concluded that not all conduct re-
sulting in restraint of trade is illegal. 16 Rather, as established in Standard
Oil Co. v. United States,17 a contract, combination, or agreement must "un-
reasonably" restrain trade in order to be within the prohibitions of section
1.18
The elements of a section 1 criminal antitrust offense, as established in
United States v. Patten,19 are the following: 1) the defendant must have
been a member of a conspiracy; and 2) such combination or agreement must
have caused an unreasonable restraint of trade.20  Although criminal conspir-
required that some standard should be resorted to for the purpose of determining
whether the prohibitions contained in the statute had or had not in any given case been
violated. Thus not specifying but indubitably contemplating and requiring a standard, it
follows that it was intended that the standard of reason which had been applied at the
common law and in this country in dealing with subjects of the character embraced by the
statute, was intended to be the measure used for the purpose of determining whether in a
given case a particular act had or had not brought about the wrong against which the
statute provided.
Id. See also 21 CONG. HEc. 2460 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Sherman). In arguing for his new bill,
Senator Sherman stated:
I admit that it is difficult to define in legal language the precise line between lawful and
unlawful combinations. This must be left for the courts to determine in each particular
case. All that we, as lawmakers, can do is to declare general principles, and we can be
assured that the courts will apply them so as to carry out the meaning of the law, as the
courts of England and the United States have done for centuries.
Id.
16. See Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). As the Supreme
Court observed: "'[Tihe legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined by so
simple a test, as whether it restrains competition. Every agreement concerning trade, every
regulation of trade, restrains." Id. at 238.
17. 221 U.S. 1 (1910).
18. Id. at 60. This standard is known as the "rule of reason." See Chicago Board of Trade v.
United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). The Chicago Board of Trade Court stated that, in using the
rule of reason approach, a court must consider
the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and
after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or proba-
ble. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the
particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.
Id. at 238. Accord, White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 261-64 (1963); Appala-
chian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 375-78 (1933). See also Bork, The Rule of
Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775, 781-820
(1965); Flittie, Judicial Notice in the Trial of Complex Cases-The Sherman Act § 1 Per Se as a
Testing Ground, 31 Sw. L.J. 819, 827-29 (1977).
19. 226 U.S. 525 (1913). In Patten, defendants were charged with "running a corner" in the
cotton market in unreasonable restraint of trade. Id. at 538-39. Defendant speculators had com-
bined to buy future contracts of a sufficient number so as to increase the market demand and
drive up the price of cotton. Id. at 539. When the prices were driven up to a higher level,
defendants would sell the contracts at a profit. id. The government charged that such a scheme
had the effect of causing similar increased cotton prices to exist in markets other than the
market in which defendants directly participated. Id.
20. Id. at 542-43. The Patten Court stated:
Section 1 of the act, upon which the counts [in this case] are founded, is not confined to
voluntary restraints, as where persons engaged in interstate trade or commerce agree to
suppress competition among themselves, but includes as well involuntary restraints, as
where persons not so engaged conspire to compel action by others, or to create artificial
conditions, which necessarily impede or burden the due course of such trade ....
Id. at 541.
[VOL. 25: p. 952
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acy generally requires both the intent to agree-necessary to establish the
existence of the conspiracy itself-and the intent to effectuate the object of
the conspiracy, 21 the Patten Court explained the absence of an intent re-
quirement in the antitrust context by concluding that the defendants "must
be held to [intend] the necessary and direct consequences of their acts." 22
After Patten, then, the burden of proof on the intent element required to
establish a criminal violation is no greater than that necessary to find a civil
violation. 23
Further simplifying the elements of a criminal antitrust violation, the
Supreme Court held, in United States v. Trenton Potteries Co.,2 that cer-
tain agreements are, as a matter of law, an unreasonable restraint of
trade. 25 These per se illegal combinations or agreements, such as an agree-
ment to fix prices, are considered so clearly anticompetitive that their
21. W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAw 464-65 (1972). For a detailed discussion of
proof of conspiracy in the criminal antitrust context, see Crane, Confronting Antitrust Doctrine
with the Law of Criminal Conspiracy: A Time for a Reevaluation and Change, 47 ANTITRUST
L.J. 635 (1978).
22. 226 U.S. at 543. The Court asserted that an allegation of specific intent is not necessary:
[Tihe conspirators must be held to have intended the necessary and direct consequences
of their acts and cannot be heard to say the contrary. In other words, by purposely
engaging in a conspiracy which necessarily and directly produces the result which the
statute is designed to prevent, they are, in legal contemplation, chargeable with intending
that result.
Id. With regard to the particular facts presented, the Patten Court agreed with the court of
appeals that, although the raising of prices in markets other than the Cotton Exchange in New
York "was 'in itself no part of the scheme,' the . .. 'prices of cotton are so correlated that it may
be said that the direct result of the acts of the conspirators was to be the raising of the price of
cotton throughout the country."' Id. at 539, quoting United States v. Patten, 187 F. 664, 671
(1911).
23. See United States v. United States-Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 n.13, 446 n.22
(1978). The Gypsum Court noted that restraint of competition as a direct result of a combination
has been a sufficient legal basis upon which to predicate both criminal and civil liability. Id. at
447, citing United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969). See also
Crane, supra note 21, at 651-54 (contended, pre-Gypsum, that intent should be an element in
criminal antitrust cases).
24. 273 U.S. 393 (1927). In Trenton Potteries, the indictment charged 20 individuals and 23
corporations, who controlled 82% of the manufacturing and distributing markets of vitreous
pottery in the United States, with, among other things, combining to fix and maintain uniform
prices for the sale of such pottery. Id. at 393-94.
25. Id. at 397-98. Although the Court framed the issue of the case in terms of whether it
was necessary to consider the reasonableness of the particular restraint charged, it upheld the
trial court's instruction to the jury "that if it found the agreements or combinations complained
of, it might return a verdict of guilty without regard to the reasonableness of the prices fixed
[or] .. .whether the prices were actually lowered or raised .. . . since [the] agreements of
themselves were unreasonable restraints." Id. at 395. See also Northern Pac. Ry. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
The Court in Northern Pacific explained that, "there are certain agreements or practices
which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are
conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to
the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use." Id. at 5. The advan-
tages of allowing per se findings of unreasonableness include added certainty as to those re-




Villanova Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 6 [1980], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol25/iss6/5
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
anticompetitive market effect is presumed and it is unnecessary to prove an
unreasonable restraint of trade. 26
Later, in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 27 the per se illegal
price-fixing rule enunciated in Trenton Potteries was expanded to include
not only direct price agreements between competitors on prices to be of-
fered in the market but also agreements to influence the market price indi-
rectly. 28 In Socony-Vacuum gasoline producers agreed to purchase "dis-
tress gasoline" which was creating an oversupply in the market and, con-
sequently, depressing and destabilizing market prices. 29  The Court held
that "a combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising,
depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity . . . is
illegal per se. " 30
Since Trenton Potteries and Socony-Vacuum, other types of agreements
or combinations have also been held to be per se violations of section 1.31 In
United States v. Topco Associates Inc., 32 for example, the defendant com-
petitors' agreement to divide and allocate market shares-i.e., horizontal
territorial market division-was held to be per se illegal. 33  Other
26. 273 U.S. at 398-99, 401. The Trenton Potteries Court held that membership in an
agreement to fix prices was sufficient evidence on which to predicate criminal liability. Id. at
401. The Court reasoned: "The aim and result of every price-fixing agreement, if effective, is
the elimination of one form of competition. The power to fix prices, whether reasonably exer-
cised or not, involves power to control the market and fix arbitrary and unreasonable prices."
Id. at 397.
27. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
28. Id. at 221-23. The Court declared that "[a]ny combination which tampers with price
structures is engaged in an unlawful activity." Id. at 221.
29. Id. at 167, 177-210. Among other things, the indictment charged that certain major oil
companies selling gasoline in the mid-wester United States agreed to raise and fix the tank car
prices of gasoline artificially through the purchase of excess gasoline on the market. Id. at
166-67. The excess gasoline was purchased from independent refiners. Id.
30. Id. at 223. Defendants argued that their agreement was unlike the one in Trenton Pot-
teries because, in Socony-Vacuum, the companies involved remained free and able to compete
on the basis of price. Id. at 159, 222. The Court, however, denied the existence of any legal
distinction between an agreement on prices to be charged and an agreement the purpose of
which is to raise prices through concerted action of some sort. Id. at 222-23. As stated by the
Court:
[It] is [not] important that the prices paid by the combination were not fixed in the sense
that they were uniform and inflexible. . . . An agreement to pay or charge rigid, uniform
prices would be an illegal agreement under the Sherman Act. But so would agreements to
raise or lower prices whatever the machinery for price-fixing was used.
Id. at 222. But see Flittie, The Sherman Act § 1 Per Se-There Ought to Be a Better Way, 30
Sw. L.J. 523, 533-35 (1976). Professor Flittie suggests that the distinction between agreeing on
prices-direct price-fixing-and agreeing to do that which will effectuate an increase in market
prices-indirect price-fixing-is significant and that, in the latter case, an abbreviated eviden-
tiary hearing is not sufficient to prove a § 1 violation. Id. at 533.
31. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (horizontal territor-
ial division); United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (vertical territorial
restrictions); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) (tying arrangements); Fash-
ion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (group boycotts); United States v. Brighton
Bldg. & Maint. Co., 598 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 840 (1979) (bid rigging).
32. 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
33. Id. at 601-06. In Topco, the defendants had agreed not to compete with each other's
allocated market in common "Topco"-label products. Id. at 599 n.3. The scheme was designed
[VOL. 25: p. 952
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agreements also found to be per se illegal under section 1 include group
boycotts,3 4 bid rigging,3 5 and tying arrangements. 3 6  On the other hand,
combinations involving vertical territorial restrictions, once held to be per se
illegal,3 7 are now subject to the "rule of reason" analysis, requiring actual
proof of an anticompetitive market effect.
3 8
The fact that an unreasonable restraint of trade is presumed in per se
violations of section 1 relieves the government of the burden of proving that
the alleged conspiracy caused an anticompetitive effect and that the effect
was an unreasonable restraint of trade.3 9  Given this presumption of the
prohibited market effect and considering that the defendant's specific intent
to make Topco products competitive with comparable, more popular private-label products sold
by the larger food chains. Id. The Court held that the agreement in Topco was a per se viola-
tion of § 1 because the defendants had agreed to reduce intradefendant competition in terms of
the Topco product through horizontal division of the markets. Id. at 608-09. The Court, in
response to defendants' argument that their purpose was to increase competition between the
defendants and the larger food chains, stated:
Topco has no authority under the Sherman Act to determine the respective values of
competition in various sectors of the economy. On the contrary, the Sherman Act gives to
each Topco member and to each prospective member the right to ascertain for itself
whether or not competition with other supermarket chains is more desirable than compe-
tition in the sale of Topco-brand products. Without territorial restrictions, Topco members
may indeed "[cut] each other's throats." ... But, we have never found this possibility
sufficient to warrant condoning horizontal restraints of trade.
Id. at 610-11, quoting White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 278 (1963) (Clark, J.,
dissenting) (bracketed matter supplied by the Topco Court). See also 405 U.S. at 605.
34. See Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941). The Court held that an
agreement among manufacturers of women's garments and textiles to refuse to deal with other
manufacturers and retailers who copied their designs was illegal per se. Id. at 468. Accord,
United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 146-47 (1966).
35. See United States v. Brighton Bldg. & Maint. Co., 598 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 840 (1979). The Seventh Circuit held that an agreement among competitors to
allow a designated party to be the lowest bidder was per se illegal under § 1 of the Sherman
Act. Id. at 1106. Accord, United States v. Flom, 558 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1977); United States
v. Champion Int'l Corp., 557 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 938 (1977); United
States v. Finis P. Ernest, Inc., 509 F.2d 1256 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 893 (1975).
36. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958). The Northern Pacific Court
held that the defendant, by requiring lessees and purchasers of its products to use defendant's
system of transportation, capitalized on its power in a per se illegal manner in violation of the
Sherman Act. Id. at 8, citing International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947).
37. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). In Schwinn, the
government brought a civil action to enjoin the "Schwinn Plan" which, among other things,
limited the locations in which, and the persons to whom, its franchised retailers could sell
Schwinn bicycles. Id. at 370-71. The Court held that Schwinn's scheme "to restrict and confine
areas or persons with whom an article may be traded after the manufacturer (Schwinn) has
parted with dominion (title) over it" was per se illegal. Id. at 379 (citations omitted). The Court
enjoined sales by Schwinn made to retailers "upon any condition, agreement or understanding
limiting the retailer's freedom as to where and to whom it will resell the products." Id. at 378.
38. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). In Continental
TV., which was decided ten years after Schwinn, the Court overruled Schwinn and held that
vertical territorial restrictions, where title to the merchandise had passed to the retailers, were
not per se violative of § 1. Id. at 58. The Court concluded that "[wihen anticompetitive effects
are shown to result from particular vertical restrictions they can be adequately policed under
the rule of reason, the standard traditionally applied for the majority of anticompetitive practices
challenged under § 1 of the Act." Id. at 59. See generally Comment, The Legal and Economic
Status of Vertical Restrictions, 23 VILL. L. REV. 547, 575-79 (1978).
39. See notes 24-36 and accompanying text supra.
1979-1980]
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to produce such an effect need not be proven, a section 1 violation could be
made out by simply proving that the defendant "knowingly participated" in,
or had the intent to agree to, a conspiracy found to be per se illegal. 40
That a director or other corporate official could be held accountable for
his acts as a representative of the corporation was established in United
States v. Wise. 4  The Wise Court rejected the defendant director's argu-
ment that a corporate official should not be considered a "person" under
section 1 because he was acting for the corporation. 42  Rather, the Court
held that a corporate officer or director is subject to section 1 liability
whenever he "knowingly participates in effecting the illegal contract, combi-
nation, or conspiracy-be he one who authorizes, orders, or helps perpe-
trate the crime ... "43
The 1978 decision of the Supreme Court in United States v. United
States Gypsum Co.,4a however, signaled a change in the traditional elements
required to prove a criminal antitrust offense, thus modifying the degree of
participation necessary for imposing criminal liability upon corporate offi-
cials. 45  Focusing on the intent to effectuate the object of the conspiracy-
40. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 446-47 n.22. See also notes
22-26 and accompanying text supra.
41. 370 U.S. 405, 416 (1962). In Wise, a grand jury returned an indictment charging Wise,
and the corporation of which he was a director, with engaging in a conspiracy to eliminate price
competition with the defendant corporation's competitors. Id. at 406. Wise moved to dismiss on
the ground that the Sherman Act did not apply to the activities of an officer or director, acting
on behalf of the corporation, no matter how illegal or culpable the activities were. Id. at 407.
Wise contended that his activities were chargeable to the corporation as the principal, and not
to him individually, because he was acting solely for his corporation. Id.
42. Id. at 409, citing United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943). The Wise Court
analogized the standard of liability for corporate directors under § 1 of the Sherman Act to the
standard developed under the Pure Food and Drug Act. 370 U.S. at 409. For a general discus-
sion of corporate officials' susceptibility to criminal liability, see Whiting, Criminal Antitrust
Liability of Corporate Representatives, 51 Ky. L. REV. 434 (1963). For a discussion of the
present viability of the Wise standard of liability, see notes 85 & 89 infra.
43. 370 U.S. at 416. For a discussion of the application of the Wise standard in Gillen, see
notes 59 & 88-89 and accompanying text infra.
44. 438 U.S. 422 (1978). Six manufacturers of gypsum board, along with 11 individual de-
fendants, were indicted as members of "a continuing agreement, understanding and concert of
action . . . to (a) raise, fix, maintain and stabilize the prices of gypsum board; (b) fix, maintain
and stabilize the terms and conditions of sale thereof; and (c) adopt and maintain uniform
methods of packaging and handling such gypsum board." Id. at 427. The government relied
almost exclusively on evidence of interdefendant telephone conversations in which exchanges of
price information occurred. Id. at 428. At trial, the jury had been charged that if the effect of
the interseller price information exchange was to raise, fix, maintain, or stabilize prices, then
the defendants were presumed, as a matter of law, to have intended that result. Id. at 434. On
appeal to the Third Circuit, the defendants' § 1 convictions were reversed, with the court
refusing to uphold the "effects alone" instruction. Id. at 435. The basis for the Third Circuit's
holding was that a "controlling circumstance" existed in that the defendants had acted for the
purpose of complying with the Robinson-Patman Act, and, hence, they should be immunized
from Sherman Act liability. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 550 F.2d 115, 126 (3d
Cir. 1977), aff'd, 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
45. See 438 U.S. at 436 n.13, 446-47 n.22. The Gypsum Court, although affirming the Third
Circuit's decision, refused to apply a "controlling circumstance" exception to § 1 liability on the
facts of the case. See id. at 458-59. For a discussion of Gypsum's impact on the "controlling
circumstance" defense, see Note, 48 U. CIN. L. REV. 179 (1979).
[VOL. 25: p. 952
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as distinguished from the intent to agree which indicates the
conspiracy 46 -the Gypsum Court held that intent to produce an anticom-
petitive effect is an element of a criminal antitrust offense and could no
longer be presumed, as a matter of law, in section 1 violations.4 7 The Court
emphasized that non-mens rea offenses, with their corresponding presump-
tions of intent, are disfavored, 48 and noted that Congress had recently up-
graded section 1 violations from misdemeanor to felony status. 49
The particular level of intent to effectuate the object of the conspiracy
required depends upon whether anticompetitive effects are shown. 50 When
anticompetitive effects are proven, the government need only show that the
defendant acted "with knowledge of the probable consequences of his
acts." 51  When anticompetitive effects are not proven, however, Gypsum
requires an elevated standard of intent-i.e., a showing that the defendant
acted "with the 'conscious object' [or purpose] of producing such effects." 52
The Third Circuit framed the issue in the Gillen appeal in terms of
whether Gypsum had elevated the government's burden of proof on the
issue of intent to restrain trade in per se offenses and hence effected a
change in the "long-established rule of law on price-fixing." 5 3 The Gillen
court highlighted a specific passage in the Gypsum decision in which the
46. 438 U.S. at 443 n.20. For a brief discussion of the two levels of intent traditionally
required in proving criminal conspiracy, see note 23 and accompanying text supra.
47. 438 U.S. at 435-36. As stated by the Gypsum Court:
A defendant's state of mind or intent is an element of a criminal antitrust offense which
must be established by evidence and inferences drawn therefrom and cannot be taken
from the trier of fact through reliance on a legal presumption of wrongful intent from
proof of an effect on prices. . . .We are unwilling to construe the Sherman Act as man-
dating a regime of strict-liability criminal offenses.
Id. at 435 (citation omitted).
48. 438 U.S. at 436-38. See also id, at 446, citing Morissette v. United States, 432 U.S. 246,
275 (1952). For a discussion of the constitutional validity of presuming an element of a criminal
offense, see note 74 infra.
49. 438 U.S. at 442-43 n. 18. For a discussion of the recent upgrading of § 1 offenses, see
note 13 supra.
50. 438 U.S. at 444-47.
51. Id. at 444. The Court noted that "action undertaken with knowledge of its probable
consequences and having the requisite anticompetitive effects can be a sufficient basis upon
which to predicate criminal liability under the antitrust laws." Id. The Court concluded that a
conscious object is unnecessary where anticompetitive effects are proven, noting that there is
"good reason for imposing liability whether the defendant desired or merely knew of the practi-
cal certainty of the results." Id. at 445, citing W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 21, at 197.
The Court emphasized that some level of intent to produce the effect was necessary because,
when "dealing with the kinds of business decisions upon which the antitrust laws focus, the
concepts of recklessness and negligence have no place." 438 U.S. at 444. See also id. at 444-45
& n.21. The Court did not discuss whether a per se presumption of anticompetitive effect
would constitute sufficient proof of such an effect for purposes of the lesser standard of intent.
Id. at 444. For an analysis of the Third Circuit's interpretation of the application of the lesser
standard of intent in per se cases, see notes 59, 63 & 75 and accompanying text infra.
52. 438 U.S. at 444 n.21. The Court noted that it did "not mean to suggest that conduct
undertaken with the purpose of producing anticompetitive effects would not also support crimi-
nal liability, even if such effects did not come to pass." Id., citing United States v. Griffith, 334
U.S. 100, 105 (1948). Cf. United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173 (1944)
(Sherman Act violation exists when purpose of agreement is to destroy one's competitors).
53. 599 F.2d at 544.
1979-19801
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Supreme Court buttressed its rationale for requiring proof of specific intent:
"With certain exceptions for conduct regarded as per se illegal because of its
unquestionably anticompetitive [side] effects, . . . the behavior proscribed
by the Act is often difficult to distinguish from the gray zone of socially
acceptable and economically justifiable business conduct." 54 The Third Cir-
cuit concluded that Gypsum had excepted per se illegal agreements from its
holding and that the Supreme Court had not intended to require proof of
intent in per se offenses. 55
The Gillen court reasoned that, since the act of fixing prices is illegal
per se, "no inquiry has to be made on the issue of intent beyond proof that
one joined or formed the conspiracy." 56  Alternatively, the court concluded
that the Gypsum level of intent to effectuate a conspiracy would always be
met in a price-fixing conspiracy because one who intends to fix prices neces-
sarily intends to restrain trade.
57
The Gillen court also reviewed whether there was substantial supportive
evidence that Gillen had "knowing[ly] participated] in effecting the illegal
contract, combination, or conspiracy." 5s The court affirmed the conviction
on the basis of the district court's findings that Gillen knew of the conspiracy
54. Id., quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 440-41 (citation
omitted) (bracketed matter supplied by the Gillen court).
55. See 599 F.2d at 544. The Third Circuit noted that the Supreme Court's decision in
Gypsum to include intent as an element of a criminal antitrust offense was born out of concern
for conduct that was only questionably anticompetitive. Id. The court reasoned that "the [Su-
preme] Court did not intend an extraordinary change in the rules of law on price-fixing because,
by its very citation of Socony-Vacuum, the court [sic] acknowledged that price-fixing cases are
an exception." Id., citing 438 U.S. at 440-41, citing United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
310 U.S. 150 (1940). The Gillen court concluded that Gypsum had not changed the "long-
established rule of law on price-fixing cases by requiring a more stringent burden of proof on
the issue of intent." 599 F.2d at 544.
56. 599 F.2d at 545. The Gillen majority distinguished Gypsum on the ground that it con-
cerned an agreement to exchange past or current price information -conduct which was not in
and of itself illegal-and that such circumstances necessarily warranted a further inquiry into
the intent of the defendants. Id. But see United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S.
333 (1969) (agreement to exchange current price information violates § 1). Agreement as to
future prices, as occurred in Gillen, has been found to constitute price-fixing and has been held
to be illegal per se, See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 226 U.S. at 539. In addition,
the majority in Gillen reasoned that, as in this case, when defendants agree to fix prices, the
agreement is itself illegal-i.e., "the criminal act is the agreement." 599 F.2d at 545.
57. 599 F.2d at 545. The court noted that "the mere existence of a price-fixing agreement
establishes a defendant's illegal purpose." Id. Further, the court declared that "[p]rice-fixing is
an area of the law in which people either can or ought to be able to predict the legal conse-
quences of their actions." Id. at 544. The Gillen court concluded that, "even if read to apply
here, Gypsum does not require a reversal because the intent requirements will always be met
in a case involving a price-fixing conspiracy. If a defendant intends to fix prices, he necessarily
intends to restrain trade." Id. at 545.
58. Id. at 546-48. Apparently equating "knowing participation" with "intent to agree," the
court considered "whether there [was] substantial evidence for the district court's finding on the
ultimate factual question of guilt." Id. at 546, citing United States v. Delerme, 457 F.2d 156,
160 (3d Cir. 1972). For a discussion of the legal standard of liability used by the Third Circuit in
examining the sufficiency of the evidence, see notes 19-22 and accompanying text supra; text
accompanying notes 66 & 86-87 infra.
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and that he was in a position to stop Blue Coal's price-fixing activity but did
not do so.5 9
Further, the Gillen court distinguished Gypsum by concluding that
Gypsum concerned whether the alleged exchange of price information hav-
ing the market effect of fixing, stabilizing, and maintaining market prices
constituted price-fixing, whereas Gillen concerned the proof necessary to
sustain a conviction for an express agreement to fix market prices.6 0
Judge Adams, although concurring in the judgment of the court, 61 re-
jected the majority's reasoning on the issue of intent and would have held
that, after Gypsum, a jury instruction on intent, when requested, is manda-
tory.6 2 According to Judge Adams the question of intent is a question of
fact in all criminal antitrust cases, and, as such, "cannot be taken from the
trier of fact through reliance on a legal presumption." 6 3 Judge Adams con-
cluded, however, that the lack of such a jury instruction was harmless error
in this case since he was satisfied "that the defendant [had] a rudimentary
awareness of economic cause and effect" tantamount to knowledge of proba-
ble anticompetitive consequences of his actions."
59. 599 F.2d at 546. The court affirmed the district court's findings and its application of the
"knowing participation" standard of corporate director responsibility under Wise. Id. The Third
Circuit noted that Gillen's opportunity to halt the conspiracy was crucial to sustain his liability,
stating that "[wihen a company president has knowledge that his company is involved in a
price-fixing conspiracy and takes no action to stop it, he may not insulate himself from liability
by leaving the actual execution of the scheme to his subordinates." Id. at 547, citing United
States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405 (1962). For a discussion of Wise, see notes 41-43 and accompany-
ing text supra. For a discussion of the impact of the Gypsum decision on the Wise standard, see
notes 88-89 and accompanying text infra.
60. See 599 F.2d at 543; note 56 supra.
61. 599 F.2d at 548, 551 (Adams, J., concurring).
62. Id. at 548 (Adams, J., concurring). Noting the Supreme Court's express inclusion of
intent to effectuate the object of the conspiracy as an element of a criminal antitrust violation,
and further noting the Court's unwillingness to accept strict liability in the antitrust context,
Judge Adams concluded that the majority's "stance [in Gillen] cannot be squared with the
explicit conclusion arrived at in Gypsum." Id., citing United States v. United States Gypsum
Co., 438 U.S. at 435-36.
63. 599 F.2d at 548-50 (Adams, J., concurring). Judge Adams maintained that Gypsum
"clarified an unsettled area of [antitrust] law" and overruled those cases which had developed
from Patten. Id. He observed that:
Patten had been regarded, first, as negating a requirement of specific intent in criminal
antitrust cases. Indeed, it had been thought, as the district court's jury charge in Gypsum
attests, that no intent whatever need be established in criminal antitrust cases when it is
shown that the defendant's conduct had anticompetitive effects. Patten has also been cited
for the proposition that it may be conclusively presumed that a defendant intends the
necessary and direct consequences of his acts. Neither of these interpretations of Patten
would appear to survive Gypsum intact. The first-that proof of specific intent is not
required-now applies only to cases where anticompetitive effects have been dem-
onstrated. The second-that a defendant may be conclusively presumed to intend the
necessary consequences of his acts-has been discarded altogether.
599 F.2d at 549 (Adams, J., concurring) (citations omitted). For a discussion of Patten, see notes
19-23 and accompanying text supra. For an analysis of the Third Circuit's presumption of intent
to effectuate the object of the conspiracy in per se cases, see notes 65-66, 86-87 and accompany-
ing text infra.
64. 599 F.2d at 550 (Adams, J., concurring).
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Gillen stands for the proposition that a defendant may be convicted of a
section 1 offense without a finding that he knew, at the time of his participa-
tion, that anticompetitive effects would probably result from the conspir-
acy.6 5 This holding that proof of "knowing participation" in a per se illegal
agreement is sufficient to sustain guilt is, however, based upon the appar-
ently discarded Patten test concerning the intent element of criminal anti-
trust liability. 66 In contrast, the Supreme Court in Gypsum recently re-
quired more than the "intent to agree" 67 - i.e., scienter, some level of
"intent to effectuate the object of the conspiracy," is required.68
Furthermore, Gypsum specifically states that, even when anticompeti-
tive effects are shown, a defendant, to be liable, must at least have had
knowledge of the probable consequences of his acts in furtherance of the
alleged conspiracy.6 9 The thrust of the Third Circuit's Gillen opinion, how-
ever, is that a member of a per se illegal combination cannot be heard to say
that he did not know the probable anticompetitive effects of his acts be-
cause, by definition, a per se offense necessarily has anticompetitive effects
within the meaning of section 1.70
As historically developed, the per se presumption simply obviates the
need to demonstrate anticompetitive effects. 7 1  This presumption of an an-
ticompetitive market effect, however, bears no relation to the element of
intent to effectuate the object of the conspiracy. 72 The Third Circuit, how-
65. See notes 55-57 and accompanying text supra. This presumption of intent to restrain
trade was historically applied in both civil and criminal cases. See generally United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 436 n.13, 445 n.21, 446-47 n.22. For a discussion of
prosecution policy under the Sherman Act, see Kramer, Criminal Prosecutions for Violations of
the Sherman Act: In Search of a Policy, 48 GEO. L.J. 530 (1960).
66. See notes 56-59 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the Patten test and
how the Gypsum decision has apparently limited it, see notes 19-23 & 63 and accompanying text
supra; notes 67-68 and accompanying text infra.
67. See notes 44-51 and accompanying text supra. The Court in Gypsum declared: "[W]e
conclude that the criminal offenses defined by the Sherman Act should be construed as includ-
ing intent as an element." 438 U.S. at 443. "Our discussion here focuses only on [the intent to
effectuate the object of the conspiracy]." Id. at 443 n.20. It is submitted that Gypsum signaled a
change in the elements of a criminal antitrust offense in order to draw a legal distinction bet-
ween criminal and civil offenses as well as between their respective burdens of proof. See 438
U.S. at 436 n.13. For a discussion of the parallel historical development of criminal and civil
antitrust offenses prior to Gypsum, see id. at 446-47 n.22.
68. 438 U.S. at 443 n.20. See note 47 and accompanying text supra.
69. See notes 51-52 and accompanying text supra.
70. 599 F.2d at 545. The court declared that "[t]he act of agreeing to fix prices is in itself
illegal; the criminal act is the agreement." Id.
71. See notes 24-36 and accompanying text supra.
72. See United States v. Foley, 598 F.2d 1323, 1335 n.13. (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1082 (1979). The Fourth Circuit noted that
Gypsum .. . involved a rule of reason offense rather than a per se violation of section 1
such as the price-fixing here alleged. While the Court's analysis is in part dependent on
the relative lack of notice provided by rule of reason offenses, the rule announced [in
Gypsum] is framed in terms of all § 1 criminal prosecutions.
Id. (emphasis added).
The presumption of a market effect in per se cases emanated from an era in which the
prosecution was merely required to assert that a defendant intended the necessary and direct
consequences of his acts. See notes 19-40 and accompanying text supra. Simply a tool of judicial
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ever, in presuming that a defendant intends the necessary consequences of
his per se illegal conduct, 73 has extended the per se presumption of an-
ticompetitive market effects and has contravened the Supreme Court's hold-
ing that intent cannot be presumed in a criminal antitrust case. 74
It is submitted that it is unrealistic to assume that, because per se of-
fenses are anticompetitive as a matter of law, a defendant necessarily has an
awareness of the anticompetitive effect. 75 Significantly, the Supreme Court
itself has been inconsistent in delimiting the conduct that constitutes a per
se offense, 76 only recently overruling its prior characterization of vertical ter-
expediency, the per se rule allows no more than a presumption that the necessary and direct
consequences of an agreement are unreasonably anticompetitive. See notes 24-26 and accom-
panying text supra. Even pre-Gypsum, showing that a defendant intended these presumed
consequences required a further, separate presumption. See notes 19-22 & 56 and accompany-
ing text supra. For further discussion of the apparent legal inconsistency of the Third Circuit's
reasoning, see notes 75-80 and accompanying text infra.
73. See notes 55-57 and accompanying text supra. While it cannot be denied that .he con-
spiracy involved in Gillen produced anticompetitive effects-a result presumed when dealing
with a per se offense-it is submitted that the Gillen court's determination that price-fixing is
an "area of the law where the defendants ought to be able to predict the legal consequences of
their acts" is equivalent to an unwarranted, conclusive presumption that defendants know that
their acts in unison with others will probably produce anticompetitive effects.
74. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 435, 446. The Supreme
Court in Gypsum held that the defendant's state of mind or intent is an element of a criminal
antitrust offense and, as such, cannot be taken from the trier of fact through reliance on a legal
presumption. Id. at 435. In so holding, the Court referred to the presumption of an intent to
produce an anticompetitive effect based on proof of an effect on prices. Id. It is submitted that
the fact that the anticompetitive effect is conclusively presumed in per se offenses is irrelevant
to the decision whether or not to apply the Gypsum instruction on intent.
The Court in Gypsum expressed concern that defendants were unable to argue that they
did not have an intent to produce an anticompetitive effect. Id. at 438. The Court noted that "a
conclusive presumption [of intent] which testimony could not overthrow would effectively
eliminate intent as an ingredient of the offense." Id. at 446, quoting Morissette v. United
States, 342 U.S. 246, 274-75 (1952). Accord, Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 522-26
(1979).
In Sandstrom, the Court expressly reaffirmed Gypsum, holding that, because the jury may
have interpreted the instruction that a defendant is presumed to intend the necessary and direct
consequences of his acts as conclusive of the issue of whether the defendant acted knowingly,
the jury instruction violated the due process requirement that the state prove every element of
a criminal offense. Id. at 524. See also Mulaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) (instruction
unconstitutionally shifted burden of proving element of criminal offense to defendant).
75. See notes 76-78 and accompanying text infra. But see United States v. Continental
Group, Inc., 603 F.2d 444 (3d Cir. 1979) (Third Circuit expressly upheld holding in Gilen). In
Continental, the defendants agreed to offer their products to their respective manufacturer pur-
chasers at specified prices, and it was reasonable to conclude that the defendants, at least
tacitly, agreed that the actual prices charged would vary in only the slightest degree. Id. at
447-48. In such an agreement, it is suggested, the defendants have agreed, and may by infer-
ence be held to intend, not to compete on the basis of price. As this inference appears over-
whelming in Continental, it is submitted that the error committed by the Third Circuit in
failing to apply the intent standard required by Gypsum was harmless. See id. at 468 (Hunter,
J., concurring). It is contended that Gillen, however, highlights that problem which the Gyp-
sum Court sought to remedy and that the Third Circuit's failure to apply the Gypsum intent
standard was not necessarily harmless error in Gillen. It is submitted that a Gypsum-type in-
struction, requiring the jury to find that, at the time Gillen himself acted, he had subjective
knowledge that his acts would probably produce anticompetitive effects, might have resulted in
Gillen's acquittal. See notes 76-83 and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of Gillen's
testimony as to his involvement in the conspiracy, see note 8 supra.
76. See notes 37-38 and accompanying text supra. Prior to Gypsum, agreements to exchange
current and/or future price information had been held to be in violation of § 1 without clear
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ritorial restrictions as per se violations of section 1. 7 7  Moreover, some per
se offenses are not as clearly anticompetitive as price fixing 7 8-e.g., argu-
ably, a defendant in Topco, who had agreed to honor exclusive territory
rights for the purpose of increasing competition between Topco and large
chain stores, did not realize the anticompetitive effect of his conduct. 79  Not-
withstanding the likelihood that a defendant in a Topco conspiracy would
have a "rudimentary knowledge" of the intradefendant anticompetitive effect
of his conduct, Gypsum mandates that the prosecution prove, and the trier
of fact find, subjective awareness or knowledge specific to each defendant.8 0
In excepting per se offenses from the Gypsum requirement of intent,
the Third Circuit appears to have read the Supreme Court's decision out of
context. 81 The Supreme Court's distinction between per se offenses and
proof of an anticompetitive effect. See, e.g., United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393
U.S. 333 (1969) (tacit agreement to readily exchange current prices charged violates § 1 irre-
spective of whether it unreasonably restrained trade); Sugar Inst. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553
(1936) (agreement requiring adherence to price increase is per se violative of § 1); American
Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921) (agreement to exchange detailed
price information where defendant's purpose was to raise prices is violative of § 1). The Court
has held, however, in factually analogous situations, that such exchanges are not violative of § 1
unless a clear showing of an unreasonable restraint of trade is made. See Maple Flooring Mfrs.
Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925) (agreement to exchange price information resulting
in a stabilization of market prices is not a restraint of trade within § 1). It is submitted that,
until judicially determined, it is not always clear whether particular conduct constitutes a per se
violation. See Flittie, supra note 30, at 530. See also C. RAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST
POLICY 142-43 (1959).
77. See notes 37-38 and accompanying text supra. For a detailed discussion of the aban-
donment of the per se rule against vertical territorial restrictions, see Flittie, supra note 18, at
829-39. See also note 30 supra.
78. So, too, some price-fixing activity may not always be clearly anticompetitive to the
defendant-perpetrator. In Socony-Vacuum, for example, the defendants, in response to a market
destabilized in terms of price, agreed to purchase the excess supply responsible for the de-
stabilization. 310 U.S. at 170-210. It is submitted that defendants in this type of situation, acting
to rectify market instability negatively impacting upon their business interests, cannot fairly be
presumed in every case to have an awareness of the anticompetitive effects of their actions.
Further, in per se price-fixing situations similar to that in Socony-Vacuum, the defendants con-
tinue to compete in terms of the market price they will ultimately charge. Id. at 218-19. It is
submitted that the Court's response in Socony-Vacuum that defendants' purpose was to stabilize
prices does not focus on the individual defendant's knowledge of the probable anticompetitive
effects of his acts.
79. See also notes 32-33 & 76 and accompanying text supra.
80. See notes 50-52 and accompanying text supra. As the Gypsum Court explicitly noted,
the fundamental difference between criminal liability and civil liability is that a criminal defend-
ant's intent must be proven and not simply presumed. See 438 U.S. at 432; note 74 supra.
81. See 438 U.S. at 440-41. The passage in question reads as follows:
[T]he same basic concerns which are manifested in our general requirement of mens rea
in criminal statutes . . . are at least equally salient in the antitrust context.
Close attention to the type of conduct regulated by the Sherman Act buttresses this
conclusion. With certain exceptions for conduct regarded as per se illegal because of its
unquestionably anticompetitive effects, see, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940), the behavior proscribed by the Act is often difficult to distin-
guish from the gray zone of socially acceptable and economically justifiable business con-
duct.
438 U.S. at 440-41. It is submitted that the Court's comparison of conduct regulated by the
Sherman Act merely "buttresses" the Court's conclusion that intent must be inquired into in
criminal antitrust cases, and does not purport to make any conclusive statement concerning per
se illegal conduct. See id. at 440.
[VOL. 25: p. 952
13
Susko: Antitrust Law - The Requirement of an Instruction on Intent in Pe
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1980
1979-1980] THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW 965
borderline violations was made, it is submitted, simply to emphasize that
anticompetitive effects are not always clear to those engaging in conduct
resulting in such effects.82 The Court did not suggest that intent instruc-
tions could be omitted in per se cases nor that a defendant's state of mind
could be presumed.8
3
The conclusive presumption in Gillen, emanating from the per se illegal
agreement, relieves the government of the burden of proving intent to effec-
tuate the object of the conspiracy which is required by Gypsum. 84  In light
of the fact that the defendant now faces a felony charge for section 1 viola-
tions, this presumption of intent apparently contravenes the fundamental
constitutional requirement that every element of a criminal offense be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.8 5
More specifically, in finding Gillen liable as a director based on his
"knowing participation," 86 the Third Circuit effectively convicted him simply
for what it found to be his intent to agree. 87 This standard for corporate
directors' liability enunciated in Wise-that a conviction is sustainable upon
proof that a director has knowledge "be he one who authorizes, orders, or
82. See 438 U.S. at 441. See also notes 75-79 and accompanying text supra.
83. For the Gypsum Court's discussion of intent, see notes 44-52 and accompanying text
supra.
84. See note 57 and accompanying text supra. As evaluated by the Gillen court, knowingly
participating in, authorizing, or helping in a per se illegal conspiracy is sufficient to sustain
criminal liability. 599 F.2d at 546-47. Thus, the Third Circuit currently holds that a defendant
need not have any particular intent that his acts be in furtherance of the presumed anticompeti-
tive effects. Id. at 545. Accord, United States v. Continental Group, Inc., 603 F.2d 444, 462
(3d Cir. 1979). But see United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 446, citing
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 274-75 (1952); note 74 supra.
85. See 438 U.S. at 442; notes 73-74 and accompanying text supra; Petitioner's Brief for
Certiorari at 8, United States v. Gillen, 444 U.S. 866 (1979). Clearly, Gypsum negates any
reading of the Sherman Act as primarily regulatory in nature. 438 U.S. at 442. Generally,
regulatory statutes have been interpreted to exclude proof of an intent to further the object of a
conspiracy as an element of the offense. Id. The Gypsum Court stated: "[W]hile in certain cases
we have imputed a regulatory purpose to Congress in choosing to employ criminal sanctions,
the availability of a range of nonpenal alternatives to the criminal sanction of the Sherman Act
negates the imputation of any such purpose to Congress in the instant context." Id. (citations
omitted). The Court distinguished § 1 violations from statutes that clearly have regulatory pur-
poses. Id. at 436-38, citing Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951). For examples of
such regulatory statutes, see, e.g., United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 613 (1971) (Brennan,
J., concurring) (non-mens rea offense appropriate where defendant violates National Firearms
Act by possessing unregistered hand grenades); United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277
(1943) (defendant held to be strictly accountable and vicariously liable for violations of the Food
and Drug Act by shipping unadulterated and misbranded drugs); United States v. Balint, 258
U.S. 250, 251-53 (1922) (unlawful sale of drugs in violation of the Narcotic Act).
The Gypsum Court further noted that statutes in which the element of intent is not ex-
pressly included by Congress will nevertheless be read with an interpretative presumption that
mens rea is required. Id. Furthermore, the Court suggested that mere congressional omission
of intent as an expressed element is not a sufficient justification for strict liability criminal of-
fenses. Id. at 437-38. For a discussion of the constitutional invalidity of presuming the elements
of an offense, see notes 73-74 and accompanying text supra.
86. See notes 8 & 55-59 and accompanying text supra.
87. See notes 56-57 and accompanying text supra.
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helps perpetrate the crime" 8 -was, it is submitted, implicitly overruled by
the Gypsum decision. 8 9
To conclude, the Third Circuit in Gillen, in construing Gypsum as ex-
cepting per se violations from its requirement of an instruction on intent in
criminal antitrust violations, does not appear to have sufficiently heeded the
Gypsum Court's concern that a defendant does not always have a subjective
awareness of the necessary and direct legal consequences of his acts. 90 Al-
though the requirement of an instruction on intent may leave the outcome of
most per se cases unchanged, it is submitted that susceptibility to a felony
conviction, with its corresponding sanction of up to three years imprison-
ment, 9'1 is sufficient to warrant treating the question of a defendant's intent
as one of fact rather than one of law. 92 While a conclusive presumption that
some conduct always has anticompetitive effects exists, it is suggested that a
further conclusive presumption, making irrelevant any inquiry into the sub-
jective state of mind of each defendant in a per se case, cannot stand after
Gypsum. 93
Andy Susko
88. 370 U.S. at 416. For a brief discussion of Wise, see notes 41-43 and accompanying text
supra.
89. Because it required a showing of intent to effectuate the object of the conspiracy, rather
than simply intent to agree, to prove § 1 criminal violations, the Gypsum decision clearly cannot
sustain a conviction of a director upon evidence that he merely helped in an agreement which
produced anticompetitive effects. See 438 U.S. at 436-43. In fact, the Gypsum Court explicitly
juxtaposed the Dotterweich standard of liability upon which the Wise Court relied with § 1
Sherman Act offenses in general. Id. at 437-38. See notes 42-43 and accompanying text supra.
In explaining past Court holdings which indicated that a criminal conviction under § 1 could be
sustained upon a Dotterweich or Wise showing, the Court noted that pre-Gypsum decisions had
not construed the Sherman Act as if it were primarily a criminal statute. Id. at 439, quoting
Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933). For a discussion of the
intermingling of proofs for both civil and criminal violations, see 438 U.S. at 446-47 n.22. Addi-
tionally, the Court explicitly rejected any notion of criminal liability based upon theories of
negligence or even recklessness. Id. at 444. In so doing, it implicitly reversed the Wise standard
of liability which itself was predicated upon the inapposite regulatory cases, such as Dotter-
weich, which were distinguished by the Gypsum Court. See id. at 437-38; note 85 supra.
90. See 438 U.S. at 438-43. For a discussion of the rationale of the per se rule and its
consequent undermining of the Gypsum holding, see notes 25-26, 61-63 & 71-74 and accom-
panying text supra.
91. For a discussion of the recent upgrading of the penalties for § 1 violations, see note 13
supra.
92. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 436-46. Other concerns
expressed by the Gypsum Court included 1) the use of conclusive presumptions which preclude
the defendant from introducing evidence to rebut the presumption; 2) the broad and imprecise
language of the Act which does not clearly define the conduct it proscribes; 3) the existing rules
of law which allow criminal convictions on a coextensive basis with civil violations; 4) the avail-
able array of noncriminal sanctions for, and the upgrading to felony status of, antitrust violations;
and 5) a general disfavoring of the non-mens rea approach to criminal antitrust law. Id. It is
submitted that these concerns are equally salient in per se cases.
93. See notes 72-74 and accompanying text supra.
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